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Abstract
It is commonly held that asynchronous consensus is
much more complex, difficult, and costly than partially-
synchronous algorithms, especially without using com-
mon coins. This paper challenges that conventional wis-
dom with que sera consensus (QSC), an approach to con-
sensus that cleanly decomposes the agreement problem
from that of network asynchrony. QSC uses only private
coins and reaches consensus in O(1) expected communi-
cation rounds. It relies on “lock-step” synchronous broad-
cast, but can run atop a threshold logical clock (TLC) al-
gorithm to time and pace partially-reliable communica-
tion atop an underlying asynchronous network. This com-
bination is arguably simpler than partially-synchronous
consensus approaches like (Multi-)Paxos or Raft with
leader election, and is more robust to slow leaders or tar-
geted network denial-of-service attacks. The simplest for-
mulations of QSC atop TLC incur expected O(n2) mes-
sages and O(n4) bits per agreement, or O(n3) bits with
straightforward optimizations. An on-demand implemen-
tation, in which clients act as “natural leaders” to ex-
ecute the protocol atop stateful servers that merely im-
plement passive key-value stores, can achieve O(n2) ex-
pected communication bits per client-driven agreement.
1 Introduction
Most consensus protocols deployed in practice are de-
rived from Paxos [58, 59], which relies on leader election
and failure detection via timeouts. Despite decades of re-
finements and reformulations [11, 24, 47, 59, 75, 85], con-
sensus protocols remain complex, bug-prone [1, 61] even
with formal verification [24], and generally difficult to un-
derstand or implement correctly. Because they rely on
network synchrony assumptions for liveness, their perfor-
mance is vulnerable to slow leaders or targeted network
denial-of-service attacks [4, 26].
Fully-asynchronous consensus algorithms [8,14,17,21,
42, 70, 81] address these performance vulnerabilities in
principle, but are evenmore complex, often slow and inef-
ficient in other respects, and rarely implemented in prac-
tical systems. The most practical asynchronous consen-
sus algorithms in particular rely on common coins [3,
3, 9, 17, 18, 21, 27, 28, 35, 42, 69, 71, 81, 96], which in
turn require even-more-complex distributed setup proto-
cols [15, 52, 56, 103].
This paper makes no attempt to break any complexity-
theoretic records, but instead challenges the conventional
wisdom that fully-asynchronous consensus is inherently
more complex, difficult, or inefficient than partially-
synchronous leader-based approaches. To this end we
introduce que sera consensus (QSC), a randomized con-
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sensus algorithm that relies only on private coins and is
expressible in 13 lines of pseudocode (Algorithm 1 on
page 7). This algorithm relies on neither leader-election
nor view-change nor common-coin setup protocols to be
usable in practice. QSC does assume private, in-order
delivery between pairs of nodes, but this requirement is
trivially satisfied in practice by communicating over TLS-
encrypted TCP connections, for example [86, 98].
QSC also relies on a new threshold synchronous broad-
cast (TSB) communication abstraction, in which coordi-
nating nodes operate logically in lock-step, but only a sub-
set of nodes’ broadcasts in each step may arrive. TSB pro-
vides each node an operation Broadcast(m) → (R,B),
which attempts to broadcast message m, then waits ex-
actly one (logical) time step. Broadcast then returns a re-
ceive set R and a broadcast set B, each consisting solely
of messages sent by nodes in the same time step.
The level of reliability a particular TSB primitive guar-
antees is defined by three parameters: a receive threshold
tr, a broadcast threshold tb, and a spread threshold ts.
A TSB(tr, tb, ts) primitive guarantees that on return from
Broadcast on any node, the returned receive set R con-
tains the messages sent by at least tr nodes. Further, the
returned broadcast set B contains messages broadcast by
at least tb nodes and reliably delivered to (i.e., appearing
in the returnedR sets of) at least ts nodes in the same time
step, provided the receiving nodes have not (yet) failed
during the time step.
To implement this synchronous broadcast abstraction
atop asynchronous networks, we introduce a class of pro-
tocols we call threshold logical clocks (TLC). Like Lam-
port clocks [57,82],TLC assigns integer numbers to com-
munication events independently of wall-clock time. Also
like Lamport clocks but unlike vector clocks [36, 37, 39,
62, 67, 82] or matrix clocks [34, 82, 87, 88, 102], all com-
municating nodes share a common logical time. Unlike
Lamport clocks, which merely label arbitrary communi-
cation timelines, TLC not only labels but also actively
paces communication so that all nodes progress through
logical time in “lock-step” – although different nodesmay
reach a logical time step at vastly different real (wall-
clock) times. Nodes that fail (crash) may be conceptually
viewed as reaching some logical time-steps only after an
infinite real-time delay.
TLCR, a simple receive-threshold logical clock algo-
rithm, implements TSB(tr, 0, 0) communication for a
configurable threshold tr, in 11 lines of pseudocode (Al-
gorithm 2 on page 10). TLCB, a broadcast-threshold
logical clock algorithm, builds on TLCR to implement
TSB(tr, tb, n) full-spread broadcast communication in
five lines of pseudocode (Algorithm 3 on page 12). Full-
spread broadcast ensures that at least tb nodes’ messages
in each round reach all nodes that have not failed by the
end of the round, as required by QSC. In a configura-
tion with n ≥ 3f nodes where at most f nodes can fail,
QSC atop TLCB (atop TLCR) ensures that each consen-
sus round enjoys at least a 1/3 probability of successful
commitment, yielding three expected consensus rounds
per agreement.
This combination represents a complete asynchronous
consensus algorithm, expressible in less than 30 lines of
pseudocode total, and requiring no leader election or com-
mon coin setup or other dependencies apart from standard
network protocols like TCP and TLS. To confirm that the
pseudocode representation is not hiding too much com-
plexity, Appendix B presents a fully-working model im-
plementation of QSC, TLCB, and TLCR in only 37 lines
of Erlang, not including test code.
QSC over TLCB is usable in n = 2f + 1 config-
urations only in the special (but common in practice)
case of f = 1 and n = 3. Alleviating this restriction,
TLCW (Algorithm 4 on page 13) directly implements
TSB(tb, tb, ts) communication for configurable tb and ts,
by proactively confirming the delivery of tb messages to
ts nodes each, similar to signed echo broadcast [84] or
witness cosigning [97] as used in other recent consensus
protocols [3, 16, 55]. TLCF (Algorithm 5 on page 14), in
turn, implements full-spread TSB(tr, tb, n) communica-
tion atop TLCW provided tr + ts > n. QSC atop TLCF
(atopTLCW) supportsminimaln = 2f+1 configurations
for any f ≥ 0, and ensures that each consensus round
succeeds with at least 1/2 probability, for two expected
consensus rounds per successful agreement.
QSC incurs only O(n) bits of communication per
round if messages are constant-size. The TLC algorithms
incur O(n4) bits per round if implemented naı¨vely, but
this is easily reduced toO(n3) with simple optimizations.
Further efficiency improvements are feasible with
QSCOD, an on-demand approach to implementing QSC.
In QSCOD, clients wishing to commit transactions
are responsible for driving communication and protocol
progress, and the stateful consensus nodes merely im-
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plement passive key-value stores. QSCOD clients effec-
tively serve as “natural leaders” to drive communication
and consensus efficiency using only O(n2) expected bits
per client-driven agreement. In transactional applications,
contention can require some clients to retry when other
clients’ proposed transactions “win.” The communication
costs of retries may be mitigated using classic techniques
such as by exponential backoff as in CSMA/CD [49], or
by committing batches of gossipped transactions together
in blocks as in Bitcoin [72].
In summary, this paper’s main contributions are (a)
threshold synchronous broadcast (TSB), a lock-step
broadcast communication abstraction with parameterized
delivery thresholds; (b) que sera consensus (QSC), a sim-
ple consensus protocol that builds atop the synchronous
TSB abstraction but requires neither leader election, view
changes, nor common coins; and (c) threshold logical
clocks (TLC), a framework for timing and pacing group
communication that builds lock-stepTSB communication
primitives atop asynchronous underlying networks.
This paper extends and formalizes ideas first proposed
informally in an earlier preprint outlining the principles
underlying threshold logical clocks [41].
2 Background
There are many different formulations of consensus and
closely-related problems such as atomic broadcast [19].
QSC’s aim is to provide a practical asynchronous consen-
sus protocol functionally equivalent to Paxos [58, 59] or
Raft [75]. In particular, QSC provides the equivalent of
Multi-Decree Paxos [58] or Multi-Paxos [23], where the
goal is to agree on not just one value, but to commit a se-
quence of proposed values progressively to form a total
order.
Because deterministic algorithms cannot solve asyn-
chronous consensus [38], QSC relies on randomness for
symmetry-breaking [6]. Like Ben-Or’s early exponential-
time randomized protocol [8] but unlike the vast major-
ity of more efficient successors, QSC relies only on pri-
vate randomness: coins that each node flips indepen-
dently of others, as provided by the random number gen-
erators standard in modern processors and operating sys-
tems. A key goal in particular is not to rely on com-
mon coins, where all nodes choose the same random val-
ues. While protocols based on secret sharing [91, 92, 94]
can produce common coins or public randomness effi-
ciently [17,21,96], robust asynchronous setup of common
coins is essentially as difficult as asynchronous consensus
itself [15, 41, 52, 56, 103].
2.1 System model and threat model as-
sumptions
We assume as usual a group of n nodes communicat-
ing over a network by sending and receiving messages.
A node broadcasts a message to the group by sending n
identical messages, one to each member including itself.
We assume nodes follow the protocols faithfully as
specified. Nodes can fail, but only by crashing cleanly
and permanently, producing no more messages after the
crash. While it appears readily feasible to extend QSC
and TLC to account for Byzantine node behavior [41], we
leave this goal for future work.
We make the standard asynchronousmodel assumption
that the network eventually delivers every message, but
only after an arbitrary finite delay of a (network) adver-
sary’s choosing. For simplicity, QSC also assumes that
messages are delivered in-order between pairs of nodes.
Both assumptions are satisfied in practice if nodes com-
municate over TCP [98] or another reliable, ordered trans-
port [40, 95, 100]. We assume ordered connections never
fail unless one endpoint fails: e.g., timeouts are disabled
and connections are protected against reset attacks [64].
QSC further assumes either that nodes communicate
over private channels (e.g., encrypted with TLS [86]), or
that the network adversary is content-oblivious [6] or un-
able to look into the content of messages or process mem-
ory. Given the prevalence of deep-packet inspection tech-
nologies that intelligent network adversaries can readily
employ, the use of encrypted channels seems safer than
obliviousness assumptions in today’s Internet.
3 Threshold Synchronous Broad-
cast (TSB)
Before describing QSC, we first introduce a conceptu-
ally simple collective communication abstraction we call
threshold synchronous broadcast (TSB). TSB presumes
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that a group of n communicating nodes conceptually op-
erates not in the asynchronous model above but in lock-
step synchronous rounds, which we will call time steps or
just steps. In each step, each node in the group that has
not (yet) failed broadcasts a message to the others, then
receives some subset of all messages sent in that round.
Messages sent are tied to and received only in the same
time-step: anymessages a node does not receive in a given
time-step are simply “lost” to that node forever and are
never delivered late.
For nowwe treat threshold broadcast as a primitive API
that a (slightly unrealistic) underlying network might con-
ceivably provide. We will later develop algorithms to im-
plement this abstraction atop asynchronous networks.
A TSB primitive does not in general offer perfect com-
munication reliability. TSB instead guarantees reliability
only so as to meet certain threshold parameters, hence
the name. We say that a broadcast primitive provides
TSB(tr, tb, ts) reliability if: (a) it guarantees that each
node receives the messages broadcast by at least tr nodes
in the same time-step, and (b) it guarantees that the mes-
sages sent by at least tb nodes are each reliably deliv-
ered or spread to at least ts nodes each. A perfectly-
reliable TSB primitive would be TSB(n, n, n), guaran-
teeing that every message sent in each round reaches ev-
ery node. A completely-unreliable TSB primitive would
be TSB(0, 0, 0), which makes no message delivery guar-
antees at all and hence might not be very useful, although
it might sometimes deliver some messages.
For simplicity, we assume time is measured in integer
units, as if each broadcast were a “real-time” operation
taking exactly one unit of time. That is, each node broad-
casts exactly one message at time-step 0 intended to be
received at time-step 1, at step 1 each node broadcasts ex-
actly one message to be received at step 2, and so on.
We represent the threshold broadcast primitive as a sin-
gle API function,Broadcast(m)→ (R,B). When a node
i calls Broadcast(m) at time-step s, the network broad-
casts messagem, waits exactly one time-step, then returns
two message sets R and B to the caller. Returned set R is
a set of messages that node i received during time-step s.
Returned set B indicates a set of messages that were each
broadcast reliably to at least ts nodes each.
When a message is reliably broadcast to a node j, this
means that node j will receive the message in the same
time-step s, unless j fails before time-step s completes.
Thus, a failed node j may count toward towards a broad-
cast message’s spread threshold ts, provided we can be
certain that node j would receive the message had it not
failed.1
A TSB(tr, tb, ts) primitive guarantees on return from
Broadcast that R contains the messages broadcast by at
least tr nodes in step s, and that B contains messages
broadcast by at least tb nodes, each of which is reliably
delivered to at least ts nodes during step s. TSB makes
no other delivery guarantees, however. For example, TSB
makes no guarantee even that i’s ownmessagem is within
the sets R or B returned to i. Further, two nodes i and j
may see different received sets Ri 6= Rj and/or differ-
ent broadcast sets Bi 6= Bj returned from their respec-
tive Broadcast calls in the same step. And two messages
m1 ∈ Bi and m2 ∈ Bi, both returned from the same
node i’s Broadcast call, may have been broadcast to dif-
ferent node sets N1 andN2 respectively: TSB guarantees
only that |N1| ≥ ts and |N2| ≥ ts and not thatN1 = N2.
Definition 3.1. A network offers a TSB(tr, tb, ts) primi-
tive provided:
• Lock-step synchrony: A call to Broadcast(m) at any
integer time-step s completes and returns at time-
step s+1, unless the node fails before reaching time-
step s+ 1.
• Receive threshold: If a node i’s call to
Broadcast(m) at step s returns (R,B), then
there is a node set NR ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
|NR| ≥ tr, and R contains exactly the set of
messages mj broadcast by nodes j ∈ NR during
step s.
• Broadcast threshold: If a node i’s call to
Broadcast(m) at step s returns (R,B), then there
is a node set NB ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |NB| ≥
tb, and B contains exactly the set of messages mj
broadcast by nodes j ∈ NB during step s.
1 An alternative, perhaps mathematically cleaner conception of node
failures is to presume that all nodes always “eventually” reach all time
steps. But when a node j “fails” before step s, this simply means that
j reaches s after an infinite real-time delay, i.e., j reaches s at wall-
clock time ∞. Adopting this viewpoint, TSB’s promise that a message
m ∈ B will “eventually” reach at least ts nodes becomes unconditional,
independent of node failure. This is because any failed node j in that set
conceptually does reach step s and receive m, only at real-time ∞.
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• Spread threshold: If a node i called Broadcast(m)
at step s, which returned (R,B) such that a message
m′ ∈ B, then there are at least ts nodes whose mes-
sage sets R to be returned from Broadcast in step s
will include messagem′.
The special case of TSB(tr, tb, n), where ts = n, rep-
resents a particularly-useful full-spread broadcast primi-
tive. Such a primitive guarantees that in each time-step
s, each reliably-broadcast message returned in any node’s
B set is delivered to all n nodes during time-step s, apart
from any nodes that fail before step s completes. A full-
spreadTSB has the useful property that theB set returned
to any node is a subset of the R set returned to any (other)
node.
Lemma 3.1. In a network of n nodes offering a full-
spread TSB(tr, tb, n) primitive, if a node i’s call to
Broadcast(m1) at step s returns (R1, B1), and a node
j’s call to Broadcast(m2) at the same step s returns
(R2, B2), then B1 ⊆ R2.
Proof. This property directly follows from the broadcast
spread property.
4 Que Sera Consensus
In this section we describe the que sera consensus (QSC)
protocol, then analyze its correctness and complexity.
4.1 Building consensus atop TSB
First we will define more precisely what properties we
desire from a consensus protocol built atop a TSB com-
munication abstraction. We will focus on implement-
ing a multi-consensus protocol, functionally analogous to
Multi-Paxos [23, 58], where nodes agree on a sequence
of values (a log) instead of just one value as in (single-
decree) Paxos [58]. For simplicity, the rest of this paper
refers to multi-consensus simply as consensus.
We represent a consensus protocol P as a process
that runs concurrently and indefinitely (or until it fails)
on each of a set of n nodes communicating via thresh-
old reliable broadcast. We consider P to be an algo-
rithm parameterized by four functions: ChooseMessage,
Deliver, RandomValue, and Broadcast. The first two
function parameters represent an “upcall-style” interface
to the application or higher-level protocol. P invokes
ChooseMessage to ask the application to choose the next
message that the application wishes to commit. P invokes
Deliver to deliver committed messages up to the appli-
cation. P’s remaining two function parameters represent
its lower-level interface to the network and operating sys-
tem. P calls RandomValue to choose a numeric value
using node-private randomness, and P calls Broadcast to
broadcast a message using the TSB primitive and obtain
the broadcast’s results one time-step later.
For simplicity of presentation and reasoning, our for-
mulation of consensus protocols will deliver not just indi-
vidual messages but entire histories, ordered lists cumula-
tively representing all messages committed and delivered
so far. An easy and efficient standard practice is to rep-
resent a history as the typically constant-size head of a
tamper-evident log [30, 90] or blockchain [72], each log
entry containing a hash-link to its predecessor. Thus, the
fact that histories conceptually grow without bound is not
a significant practical concern.
Intuitively, the key properties we want from P are
liveness, validity, and consistency. Liveness means
that P regularly keeps advancing time and delivering
progressively-longer histories via Deliver, forever or until
the node fails. Validity means that any message delivered
by any node is one that the application recently returned
via ChooseMessage on some (potentially different) node.
Finally, consistency means that a history delivered in an
earlier time-step is a prefix of any history delivered in a
later time-step, both on the same node and across distinct
nodes.
Definition 4.1. A multi-consensus protocol P is a
potentially-randomized algorithm that takes function
parameters (ChooseMessage,Deliver,RandomValue,
Broadcast) and behaves as follows:
• Liveness: If h is the longest history P has delivered
by time-step s on some non-failing node i, or h = []
if P has not yet invoked Deliver by step s, then there
is some future time-step s′ > s at which P invokes
Deliver(h′) with some history h′ strictly longer than
h (i.e., |h′| > |h|).
• Validity: For some constant δ ≥ 0, if P invokes
Deliver(h′ || [p]) at time-step s′ on node j, then p
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is a proposal 〈proposal i,m, r〉 that node i returned
from an invocation of ChooseMessage at some time-
step s ≤ s′, where s′ − s ≤ δ.
• Consistency: if P invokes Deliver(h) at time-step s
on node i, and P later invokes Deliver(h′) at time-
step s′ ≥ s on node j (either the same or a different
node), then h is a prefix of h′.
P’s behavior above is contingent on its function pa-
rameters satisfying operational specifications described
below.
The application upcall function parameters
ChooseMessage and Deliver may behave in arbi-
trary application-specific fashions, provided they do
not interfere with the operation of QSC or the lower
layers it depends on (e.g., by corrupting memory, or
de-synchronizing the nodes via unexpected calls to
Broadcast). ChooseMessage always returns some
message, which may be an empty message if the ap-
plication has nothing useful to broadcast in a given
time-step. The RandomValue function must return a
numeric value (integer or real) from a nontrivial random
distribution, containing at least two values each occurring
with nonzero probability, and from the same random
distribution on every node. The Broadcast function
must correctly implement a threshold reliable broadcast
primitive as described above in Section 3.
4.2 Que Sera Consensus (QSC) algorithm
Algorithm 1 concisely summarizes que sera consensus
(QSC), a simple multi-consensus algorithm satisfying the
above specification. The QSC algorithm is a process that
runs on each of the n nodes forever or until the node fails.
Each iteration of the main loop implements a single con-
sensus round, which may or may not deliver a new history
h.
The QSC algorithm depends on Broadcast providing a
full-spread TSB(tr , tb, n) abstraction (Section 3). Each
consensus round invokes this Broadcast primitive twice,
thus taking exactly two broadcast time-steps per consen-
sus round.
Each node maintains its own view of history, denoted
by h, which increases in size by one entry per round. Each
node does not build strictly on its own prior history in
each round, however, but can discard its own prior history
in favor of adopting one built by another node. In this way
QSC’s behavior is analogous to Bitcoin [72], in which the
“longest chain” rule may cause a miner to abandon its own
prior chain in favor of a longer chain on a competing fork.
QSC replaces Bitcoin’s “longest chain” rule with a “high-
est priority” rule, however.
At the start of a round, each node i invokes
ChooseMessage to choose an arbitrary messagem to pro-
pose in this round, possibly empty if i has nothing to
commit. This message typically represents a transaction
or block of transactions that the application running on i
wishes to commit, on behalf of itself or clients it is serv-
ing. Node i also uses RandomValue to choose a random
numeric priority r using node-private (not shared) ran-
domness. Based on this information, node i then appends
a new proposal 〈proposal i,m, r〉 to the prior round’s his-
tory and broadcasts this new proposed history h′ using
Broadcast, which returns sets R′ and B′.
From the set B′ of messages that TSB promises were
reliably broadcast to all non-failed nodes in this first
Broadcast call, node i picks any history h′′ (not neces-
sarily unique) having priority at least as high as any other
history in B′, and broadcasts h′′. This second Broadcast
call returns history setsB′′ andR′′ in turn. Finally, i picks
from the resulting setR′′ any best history (Definition 4.2),
i.e., any history (again not necessarily unique) with prior-
ity at least as high as any other in R′′, as the resulting
history for this round and the initial history for the next
round from node i’s perspective. We define the priority of
a nonempty history as the priority of the last proposal it
contains. Thus, a history h = [. . . , 〈proposal i,m, r〉] has
priority r.
Definition 4.2. A history h is best in a set H if h ∈ H
and no history h′ ∈ H has priority strictly greater than
h.
The resulting history each node arrives at in a round
may be either tentative or final. Each node decides sepa-
rately whether to consider its history tentative or final, and
nodesmaymake different decisions on finality in the same
round. Each node i then delivers the resulting history h
to the application built atop QSC, via a call to Deliver,
only if node i determined h to be final. If i decides that h
is tentative, it simply proceeds to the next round, leaving
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Algorithm 1: Que Sera Consensus (QSC)
Input: configuration parameters n, tr, tb, ts, where tr > 0, tb > 0, and ts = n
Input: function parameters ChooseMessage, Deliver, RandomValue, Broadcast
Run the following concurrently on each communicating process i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
h← [] // consensus history is initially empty
forever // loop forever over consensus rounds
m← ChooseMessage () // choose some message for node i to propose
r ← RandomValue() // choose proposal priority using private randomness
h′ ← h || [〈proposal i,m, r〉] // append one new proposal to our view of history
(R′, B′)← Broadcast(h′) // broadcast our proposal and advance one time-step
h′′ ← any best history in B′ // choose best eligible history we know of so far
(R′′, B′′)← Broadcast(h′′) // re-broadcast the best proposal we see so far
h← any best history in R′′ // choose our best history for next consensus round
if h ∈ B′′ and h is uniquely best in R′ then // history h has no possible competition
Deliver (h) // deliver newly-committed history
end
end
its view of history effectively undecided until some future
round eventually delivers a final history.
A node i decides that its resulting history h in a round
is final if (a) h is in the set B′′ returned from the second
broadcast, and (b) h is the uniquely best history in the set
R′ returned from the first broadcast.
Definition 4.3. A history h is uniquely best in a set H if
h ∈ H and there is no other history h′ 6= h such that h′
is also inH and has priority greater than or equal to that
of h.
This pair of finality conditions is sufficient to ensure
that all nodes will have chosen exactly the same resulting
history h at the end of this round, as explained below –
even if other nodes may not necessarily realize that they
have agreed on the same history. Since all future consen-
sus rounds must invariably build on this common history
h regardless of which nodes’ proposals “win” those future
rounds, node i can safely consider h final and deliver it to
the application, knowing that all other nodes will similarly
build on h regardless of their individual finality decisions.
4.3 Correctness of QSC
While the QSC algorithm itself is simple, analyzing the
correctness of any consensus protocol involves some sub-
tleties, which we examine first intuitively then formally.
The main challenges are first, ensuring that the histories
it delivers are consistent, and second, that it determines
rounds to be final and delivers longer histories “reason-
ably often.” This section only states key lemmas and the
main theorem; the proofs may be found in Appendix A.1.
4.3.1 Safety
Consistency is QSC’s main safety property. We wish to
ensure that if at some step s a node i delivers history h,
and at some later step s′ ≥ s any node j delivers history
h′, then h is a prefix of h′. That is, every node consistently
builds on any history prefix delivered earlier by any other
node. To accomplish this, in QSC each node i delivers a
history h only if i can determine that all other non-failed
nodes must also become aware that h exists and can be
chosen in the round, and that no other node could choose
any other history in the round.
Each node first chooses some best (highest-priority) el-
igible history h′′ from the set B′ returned by the first
Broadcast call. Set B′ includes only confirmed histo-
ries: those that i can be certain all non-failed nodes will
become aware of during the round. By the full-spread
requirement (ts = n) on the TSB primitive, history h
′′
must be included in the R′ sets returned on all non-failed
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nodes, ensuring this awareness requirement even if other
nodes choose different histories.
After the second Broadcast(h′′) call, all histories re-
turned in R′′ and B′′ are confirmed histories. Further,
any history h ∈ B′′ is not just confirmed but reconfirmed,
meaning that all non-failed nodes will learn during the
round not just that h exists but also the fact that h was
confirmed. Each node i chooses, as its tentative history to
build on in the next round, some (not necessarily unique)
highest-priority confirmed proposal among those in R′′
that i learns about.
Finally, i considers h committed and actually delivers
it to the application only if h is both reconfirmed (in B′′)
and uniquely best within the broader set R′ that includes
all confirmed proposals other nodes could choose in this
round. These two finality conditions ensure that (a) all
nodes know that h is confirmed and thus can choose it as
their tentative history, and (b) all nodesmust choose h be-
cause it is uniquely best among all the choices they have.
This does not guarantee that other nodes will know that h
is committed, however: another node j 6= i might not ob-
serve the finality conditions, but will nevertheless “oblivi-
ously” choose and build on h, learning only in some later
round that h is final.
A key first step is showing that any node’s (tentative or
final) history at any round builds on some node’s (tentative
or final) history at any prior round.
Lemma 4.1. History preservation: If a consensus round
starting at time-step s has initial history hsi on node i,
then at any earlier consensus round starting at step s′ <
s, there exists some node j whose initial history hs′
j
in
that round is a strict prefix of hsi .
Consistency, QSC’s main safety property, relies on the
fact that each node i delivers a resulting history in a con-
sensus round only when i is sure that all nodes will choose
the same resulting history in that round. The above lemma
in turn guarantees that the histories all nodes build on and
potentially deliver in the future must build on this com-
mon history.
Lemma 4.2. Agreement on delivery: If QSC delivers his-
tory h(s+2)i on node i at the end of a consensus round
starting at time-step s, then the resulting history h(s+2)j
of every node j in the same round is identical to h(s+2)i .
4.3.2 Liveness
The other main prerequisite toQSC’s correctness is ensur-
ing its liveness, i.e., that it makes progress. Unlike safety,
liveness is probabilistic: QSC guarantees only that each
node has a “reasonable” nonzero chance of delivering a
committed history in each round. This ensures in turn
that for each node i, after any time-step s, with probabil-
ity 1 there exists some future time-step s′ ≥ s at which i
delivers some (next) final history.
QSC’s liveness depends on the network scheduling
message delivery independently of the contents of propos-
als. More precisely, QSC assumes that the network un-
derlying TSB primitive chooses the sets NR and NB , de-
termining which messages each node receives and learns
were reliably broadcast (Definition 3.1), independently
of the random priority values contained in the propos-
als. As mentioned before, in practice, we can satisfy this
assumption either by assuming a content-oblivious net-
work scheduler [6], or by using private channels (e.g., en-
crypted by TLS [86]).
Lemma 4.3. If the network delivery schedule is indepen-
dent of proposal priorities and pt is the probability that
two nodes tie for highest priority, then each node delivers
a history in each round independently with probability at
least tb/n− pt.
4.3.3 Overall correctness of QSC
The above lemmas in combination ensure that QSC cor-
rectly implements consensus.
Theorem 4.1. QSC implements multi-consensus on n
nodes (Definition 4.1) atop a full-spread TSB primitive
TSB(tr, tb, n) where tr > 0 and tb > 0.
Notice thatQSC’s correctness theorem makes no direct
assumptions about the number of failing nodes, in par-
ticular not mentioning the standard majority requirement
n > 2f . This is because the number of failing nodes af-
fects only liveness, and QSC depends for liveness on the
undelying TSB primitive’s unconditional promise to re-
turn from each Broadcast call in exactly one time-step.
It will prove impossible to implement a TSB(tr, tb, ts)
primitive where tr > n − f or tb > n − f , because
the primitive would have to collect messages from failed
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nodes in order to returnR andB sets of the promised size
after each step. But that is TSB’s problem, not QSC’s.
4.4 Asymptotic complexity of QSC
Implementing QSC naı¨vely, the histories broadcast in
each round would grow linearly with time. We can make
QSC efficient, however, by adopting the standard prac-
tice of representing histories as tamper-evident logs or
blockchains [30, 72, 90]. Each broadcast needs to con-
tain only the latest proposal or head of the history, which
refers to its predecessor (and transitively to the entire
history) via a cryptographic hash. Since QSC does not
need anything but the head in each round, this is suf-
ficient. With this optimization, the two messages each
node broadcasts in each round are O(1) size. The to-
tal message and communication complexity of QSC is
therefore O(n2) per round across the n nodes, assum-
ing each broadcast requires n unicast transmissions (ef-
ficient broadcast would eliminate a factor of n). Provided
tb/n is constant, it takes a constant expected number of
rounds (namely n/tb) to commit and deliver a new con-
sensus result, so each consensus progress event likewise
incurs O(n2) expected communication complexity. This
analysis neglects the cost of implementing the underlying
TSB abstraction that QSC builds on, of course, an issue
we address later.
5 Threshold Logical Clocks
Since the TSB abstraction seems somewhat tailor-made
for implementing consensus, it would not be particularly
useful if it were almost as difficult to implement TSB as
to implement consensus directly. Fortunately, there are
multiple clean and simple ways to implement the TSB
primitive atop realistic, fully-asynchronous networks.
For this purpose we develop several variants of a lower-
level abstraction we call threshold logical clocks (TLC).
The main purpose of TLC is to provide the illusion of
lock-step synchrony that theTSB abstraction presents and
that QSC relies on, despite the underlying network be-
ing asynchronous. Secondarily, a TLC also conveniently
provides the communication patterns needed to imple-
ment the threshold reliability that the TSB abstraction
promises.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 5.1 we introduce TLCR, a simple receive-threshold
logical clock algorithm realizing TSB(tr, 0, 0). After-
wards, in Section 5.2, we discuss TLCB a broadcast-
threshold logical clock algorithm building on top of
TLCR to provide full-spread broadcast communication
TSB(tr, tb, n). In Section 5.3 we then present TLCW,
a witnessed-threshold logical clock algorithm implement-
ingTSB(tr, tb, ts) communication, amending some of the
restrictions of TLCB. Finally, in Section 5.4, we describe
TLCF, which builds full-spread witness broadcast com-
munication TSB(tr, tb, n) on top of TLCR and TLCW.
Proofs for theorems in this section are in Appendix A.2.
5.1 TLCR: receive-threshold synchrony on
asynchronous networks
Algorithm 2 implements a TSB(tr, 0, 0) abstraction atop
an asynchronous network, ensuring that each node re-
ceives messages from at least tr nodes during each log-
ical time-step. Although TLCR tolerates messages be-
ing scheduled and delayed arbitrarily, it makes the stan-
dard assumption that a message broadcast by any node is
eventually delivered to every other non-failing node. For
simplicity, TLCR also assumes messages are delivered in-
order between any pair of nodes, e.g., via any sequenced
point-to-point transport such as TCP.
In TLCR, each node broadcasts a message at the be-
ginning of each step s, then waits to receive at least tr
messages from step s. TLCR internally logs the receive-
set it returns from each step in ~R, whose length tracks the
current time-step.
Each node’s broadcast in each step also includes the
receive-set with which it completed the previous step. If
a node receives any message from step s + 1 before col-
lecting a threshold of messages from s, it immediately
completes step s using the previous receive-set it just ob-
tained. Because of the above assumption messages are
pairwise-ordered (e.g., by TCP), a node never receives a
message for step s+2 or later before receiving a message
for step s + 1 from the same node, and thus never needs
to “catch up” more than one step at a time.
As an alternative to including the previous step’s re-
ceive set in each broadcast, TLCR could simply defer the
processing of messages for future steps until the receive
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Algorithm 2: TLCR(m), using a threshold logical clock to implement receive-threshold synchronous broadcast
Configuration : node number i, number of nodes n, receive threshold tr ≤ n
Configuration : functions Receive, Broadcast representing underlying asynchronous network API
Persistent state : receive message-set log ~R, initialized to the singleton list [{}]
Function input : messagem to broadcast in this time-step
Function output: sets (R,B) of messages received in this time-step, and reliably broadcast (always empty)
~R← ~R || [{}] // start a new logical time-step with an empty receive message-set
Broadcast(〈i,m, |~R|, ~R|~R|−1〉) // broadcast our message, current time-step, and last message-set
while |~R|~R|| < tr do // loop until we reach receive threshold tr to advance logical time
〈j,m′, s′, R′〉 ← Receive() // await and receive next messagem′ from any node j
if s′ = |~R| then // messagem′ was sent in our current time-step
~R|~R| ←
~R|~R| ∪ {〈j,m
′〉} // collect messages received in this time-step
else if s′ > |~R| then // messagem′ is from the next step due to in-order channels
~R|~R| ←
~R|~R| ∪R
′ // virally adopt message-set R′ that j used to advance history
end
end
return ({m′ | 〈j,m′〉 ∈ ~R|~R|}, {}) // return the received message set and an empty broadcast set
threshold is met for the current step. This approach elimi-
nates the pairwise ordered-delivery assumption, at the po-
tential cost of slightly slower progress in practice because
messages arriving early from future time steps cannot ”vi-
rally” help delayed nodes make progress.
Theorem 5.1. TLCR (Algorithm 2) implements a
TSB(tr, 0, 0) communication primitive with receive
threshold 0 ≤ tr ≤ n, provided at most f ≤ n − tr
nodes fail.
5.1.1 Asymptotic complexity of TLCR
Since each node broadcasts exactly one message per time-
step, TLCR incurs a total messsage complexity of O(n2)
per round across the n nodes, assuming each broadcast
requires n unicasts.
If the messages passed to TLCR are constant size,
then TLCR incurs a communication complexity of O(n3)
per round because of TLCR’s inclusion of the previ-
ous round’s receive-set in each broadcast. Implement-
ing TLCR naı¨vely, if the messages passed to TLCR are
O(n) size, then total communication complexity is there-
fore O(n4) per round, and so on.
A simple way to reduce this communication cost, how-
ever, is simply to defer the processing of messages for
future time steps that arrive early, as discussed above.
This way, broadcasts need not include the prior round’s
receive-set, so communication complexity is only O(n2)
per round when application messages are constant size.
Another approach is to replace the application mes-
sages themselves with constant-size references (e.g.,
cryptographic hashes) to out-of-line blocks, and to use
a classic IHAVE/SENDME protocol as in USENET [46]
on the point-to-point links between nodes to transmit only
messages that the receiver has not yet obtained from an-
other source. In brief, on each point-to-point message
transmission the sender first transmits the summary mes-
sage containing only references; the sender then waits
for the receiver to indicate for which references the re-
ceiver does not yet have the corresponding content; and
finally the sender transmits only the content of the re-
quested references. With this standard practice in gossip
protocols, each node typically receives each content block
only once (unless the node simultaneously downloads the
same block from multiple sources to minimize latency at
the cost of bandwidth).
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Implementing TLCR in this way, each round incurs a
communication complexity of O(n3) per round even if
the messages passed to TLCR are O(n) size. This is
because each node proposes only one new message m
per round and each node receives its content only once,
even if the prior round receive-set in each round’s pro-
posal refers to O(n) messages from the prior round via
constant-size references (e.g., hashes).
5.2 TLCB: broadcast-threshold synchrony
atop TLCR
Although TLCR provides no broadcast threshold guar-
antees, in suitable network configurations, TLCB (Algo-
rithm 3) does so by simply using two successive TLCR
rounds per (TLCB) time-step. In brief,TLCB uses its sec-
ondTLCR invocation to broadcast and gather information
about which messages sent in the first TLCR invocation
were received by enough (ts) nodes. Simple “pigeon-
hole principle” counting arguments ensure that enough
(tb) such first-round messages are so identified, provided
the configuration parameters n, tr, tb, and ts satisfy cer-
tain constraints. These constraints are specified in the
following theorem, whose detailed underlying reasoning
may be found in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 5.2. If 0 < tr ≤ n − f , 0 < ts ≤ tr, 0 <
tb ≤ n− fb where fb = tr(n− tr)/(tr − ts + 1), and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCB (Algorithm 3) implements
a TSB(tr, tb, ts) partial-spread broadcast abstraction.
Suppose we desire a configuration tolerating up to f
node failures, and we set n = 3f , tr = 2f , tb = f ,
and ts = f + 1. Then fb = 2f(3f − 2f)/(2f − (f +
1) + 1) = 2f , so tb ≤ n − fb as required. This TLCB
configuration therefore reliably delivers at least tb = n/3
nodes’ messages to at least ts = n/3 + 1 nodes each in
every step.
5.2.1 Full-spread reliable broadcast using TLCB
If we configure TLCB above to satisfy the additional con-
straint that tr + ts > n, then it actually implements full-
spread reliable broadcast or TSB(tr, tb, n). This con-
straint reduces to the classic majority rule, n > 2f , in
the case tr = ts = f where at most f nodes fail.
Under this constraint, each of the (at least tb) messages
in the set B returned from TLCB on any node is guaran-
teed to appear in the set R returned from the same TLCB
round on every node that has not yet failed at that point.
Intuitively, this is because the first TLCR call propagates
each message inB to at least ts nodes, every node collects
R′ sets from at least tr nodes during the second TLCR
call, and since tr + ts > n these spread and receive sets
must overlap.
Theorem 5.3. If 0 < tr ≤ n−f , 0 < ts ≤ tr, tr+ts > n,
0 < tb ≤ n−fb where fb = tr(n−tr)/(tr−ts+1), and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCB (Algorithm 3) implements
a TSB(tr, tb, n) full-spread broadcast abstraction.
Under these configuration constraints, therefore,TLCB
provides a TSB abstraction sufficient to support QSC
(Section 4). This consensus algorithm supports the op-
timal 2f + 1 node count for the special case of f = 1
and n = 3, which in practice is an extremely common
and important configuration. For larger f , however, run-
ning QSC on TLCB requires n to grow faster than 2f +1.
This limitation motivates witnessed TLC, described next,
which is slightly more complex but allowsQSC to support
an optimal n = 2f + 1 configuration for any f ≥ 0.
5.2.2 Asymptotic complexity of TLCB
Implementing TLCB naı¨vely on naı¨vely-implemented
TLCR yields a total communication complexity of O(n4)
per round if the messages passed to TLCB are of size
O(1).
As discussed above in Section 5.1.1, however, this cost
may be reduced by delaying the processing of messages
for future time steps, or by using hash-references and an
IHAVE/SENDME protocol on the point-to-point links. In
this case, TLCR incurs a communication complexity of
O(n3) per round with O(1)-size messages, because the
set R′ in the second broadcast is not actually an O(n)-
length list of O(n)-size messages, but is rather an O(n)-
size list of O(1)-size hash-references to messages whose
content each node receives only once.
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Algorithm 3: TLCB(m), using two TLCR steps to implement spread-threshold synchronous broadcast
Configuration : node number i, number of nodes n, receive threshold tr ≤ n, and spread threshold ts ≤ tr
Configuration : function TLCR implementing TSB(tr, 0, 0) unreliable synchronous broadcast
Function input : messagem to broadcast in this TLCB step
Function output: sets (R,B) of messages received and reliably broadcast, respectively, in this TLCB step
(R′, )← TLCR(m) // broadcast our message unreliably in the first TLCR step
(R′′, )← TLCR(R′) // rebroadcast all messages we received in the first TLCR step
R←
⋃
({R′} ∪R′′) // collect all messages we received directly or indirectly
B ← {m′ | at least ts message-sets in R
′′ containm′} // messages we know were seen by at least ts nodes
return (R,B)
5.3 TLCW: witnessed threshold logical
clocks
TLCW (Algorithm 4) in essence extends TLCR (Sec-
tion 5.1) so that each node i works proactively in each
round to ensure that at least tb nodes’ messages are re-
ceived by at least ts nodes each, and waits until i can con-
firm this fact before advancing to the next logical time-
step.
TLCW accomplishes this goal by having each node run
an echo broadcast protocol [19] in parallel, to confirm that
its own message has been received by at least ts nodes,
before its message is considered threshold witnessed and
hence “counts” toward a goal of tb such messages. Vari-
ants of this technique have been used in other recent con-
sensus protocols such as ByzCoin [55] and VABA [3]. As
in TLCR, a slow node can also catch up to another node at
a later timestep by reusing the set of threshold-witnessed
messages that the latter node already used to advance log-
ical time.
Theorem 5.4. If 0 < tb ≤ n− f , 0 < ts ≤ n− f , and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCW (Algorithm 4) implements
a TSB(tb, tb, ts) partial-spread broadcast abstraction.
5.4 TLCF: full-spread threshold syn-
chronous broadcast with TLCW and
TLCR
While TLCW directly implements only partial-spread
threshold synchronous broadcast, similar to TLCB above
we can “bootstrap” it to full-spread synchronous broad-
cast in configurations satisfying tr + ts > n. TLCF,
shown in Algorithm 5, simply follows a TLCW round
with a TLCR round. By exactly the same logic as in
TLCB, this ensures that each message in the broadcast set
B returned from TLCW propagates to every node that has
not failed by the end of the subsequent TLCR round, be-
cause all the broadcast-spread sets in TLCW overlap with
all the receive-sets in the subsequent TLCR.
Theorem 5.5. If 0 < tr ≤ n − f , 0 < tb ≤ n − f ,
0 < ts ≤ n − f , tr + ts > n, and at most f nodes fail,
then TLCF (Algorithm 5) implements a TSB(tr, tb, n)
full-spread broadcast abstraction.
6 On-demand client-driven imple-
mentation of TLC and QSC
In appropriate network configurations,QSC (Section 4.2)
may be implemented atop either full-spread TLCB (Sec-
tion 5.2.1) or TLCF (Section 5.4). Supporting a fully-
asynchronous underlying network, these combinations
progress and commit consensus decisions continuously
as quickly as network connectivity permits. Using the
optimizations described in Sections 4.4, 5.1.1, and 5.2.2,
these implementations incur expected total communica-
tion costs ofO(n3) bits per successful consensus decision
and QSC history delivery.
We would like to address two remaining efficiency
challenges, however. First, in many practical situations
we want consensus to happen not continuously but only
on demand, leaving the network idle and consuming no
bandwidth when there is no work to be done (i.e., no trans-
actions to commit). Second, it would be nice ifQSC could
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Algorithm 4: TLCW(m), a witnessed threshold logical clock implementing TSB(tb, tb, ts) synchronous broad-
cast
Configuration : node number i, number of nodes n, broadcast threshold tb ≤ n, spread threshold ts ≤ n
Configuration : functions Receive, Broadcast, Unicast representing underlying asynchronous network API
Persistent state : message receive log ~R and broadcast log ~B, each initialized to a singleton list [{}]
Function input : messagem to broadcast in this time step
Function output: sets (R,B) of messages received, and reliably broadcast, in this time-step
(~R, ~B)← (~R || [{}], ~B || [{}]) // start a new logical time-step with empty receive and broadcast sets
NA ← {} // initially empty witness acknowledgment set for our messagem
Broadcast(〈req, i,m, |~R|, ~R|~R|−1,
~B|~R|−1〉) // broadcast our request, current time-step, and last message-sets
while | ~B|~R|| < tb do // loop until we reach broadcast threshold tb to advance logical time
switch Receive() do // receive the next message from any node
case 〈req, j,m′, |~R|, , 〉 do // request messagem′ from node j in the same time-step
~R|~R| ←
~R|~R| ∪ {〈j,m
′〉} // collect messages we received and witnessed in this time-step
Unicast(j, 〈ack, i,m′, |~R|, ~R|~R|−1,
~B|~R|−1〉) // acknowledge node j’s request as a witness
case 〈ack, j,m, |~R|, , 〉 do // acknowledgment of our requestm from node j
NA ← NA ∪ {j} // collect acknowledgments of our request message
if |NA| = ts then // our message has satisfied the spread threshold ts
Broadcast(〈wit, i,m, |~R|, ~R|~R|−1,
~B|~R|−1〉) // announce our messagem as fully witnessed
end
case 〈wit, j,m′, |~R|, , 〉 do // announcement that j’s messagem′ was witnessed by ts nodes
~B|~R| ←
~B|~R| ∪ {〈j,m
′〉} // collect fully-witnessed messages received in this time-step
case 〈 , , , |~R|+ 1, R′, B′〉 do // messagem′ is from the next step due to in-order channels
(~R|~R|,
~B|~R|)← (
~R|~R| ∪R
′, ~B|~R| ∪B
′) // virally adopt message-sets that j used to advance history
end
end
end
return ({m′ | 〈j,m′〉 ∈ ~R|~R|}, {m
′ | 〈j,m′〉 ∈ ~B|~R|}) // return the final message sets for this time-step
achieve the optimal lower bound of O(n2) communica-
tion complexity, at least in common-case scenarios.
6.1 Consensus over key-value stores
With certain caveats, we can achieve both efficiency goals
above by implementing QSC and TLC in a client-driven
architecture. In this instantiation, the n stateful nodes
representing the actual consensus group members are
merely passive servers that implement only a locally-
atomic write-once key-value store.
Definition 6.1. A write-once store servesWrite and Read
requests from clients. A Write(K,V ) operation atomi-
cally writes value V under keyK provided no value exists
yet in the store under keyK , and otherwise does nothing.
A Read(K) → V operation returns the the value written
under key K , or empty if no value has been written yet
under keyK .
In practice the n servers can be any of innumerable
distributed key/value stores supporting locally-atomic
writes [51, 73, 80, 83]. The n servers might even be stan-
dard Unix/POSIX file systems, mounted on clients via
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Algorithm 5: TLCF(m), using TLCW and TLCR to implement full-spread threshold synchronous broadcast
Configuration : node number i, number of nodes n, receive threshold tr ≤ n, broadcast threshold tb ≤ n, and
spread threshold ts ≤ n, such that tr + ts > n
Configuration : function TLCR implementing TSB(tr, 0, 0) receive-threshold synchronous communication
Configuration : function TLCW implementing TSB(tb, tb, ts) witnessed broadcast-threshold synchronous
communication
Function input : messagem to broadcast in this TLCF step
Function output: sets (R,B) of messages reliably broadcast and received, respectively, in this TLCF step
(R′, B)← TLCW(m) // broadcast at least tb messages to at least ts nodes each
(R′′, )← TLCR(R′) // rebroadcast all messages we received in the first step
R←
⋃
({R′} ∪R′′) // collect all messages we received directly or indirectly
return (R,B)
NFS [44] for example.2
6.2 Representing the QSC/TLC state ma-
chine
Each of the n key/value stores implicitly represents the
current state of that node’s QSC/TLC state machine, as
simulated by the clients. One transition in each server’s
state machine is represented by exactly one atomic key/-
value Write. All keys ever used on a node inhabit a well-
defined total order across both TLC time-steps and state
transitions within each step. To track the n servers’ con-
sensus states and drive them forward, each client locally
runs n concurrent threads or processes, each simulating
the state machine of one of the servers.
To read past consensus history from each server i and
catch up to its current state, a client’s local state-machine
simulation thread i simply reads keys from i in their well-
defined sequence, replaying the QSC/TLC state machine
defined by their values at each transition, until the client
encounters the first key not yet written on the server.
Clients that are freshly started or long out-of-date can
catch up more efficiently using optimizations discussed
later in Section 6.4.
2 A standard way to implement Write atomically on a POSIX file
system is first to write the contents of V to a temporary file (ensuring that
a partially-written file never exists under name K), attempt to hard-link
the temporary file to a filename for the target nameK (the POSIX link
operation fails if the target name already exists), and finally unlink the
temporary filename (which deletes the file if the link operation failed).
To advance consensus state, each client’s n simulation
threads coordinate locally to decide on and (attempt to)
write new key-value pairs to the servers, representing non-
deterministic but valid state transitions on those servers.
Each of these writes may succeed or fail due to races with
other clients’ write attempts. In either case, the client ad-
vances its local simulation of a given server’s state ma-
chine only after a read to the appropriate key, i.e., accord-
ing to the state transition defined by whichever client won
the race to write that key.
We outline only the general technique here. QSCOD,
Algorithm 6 in Appendix C, presents pseudocode for a
specific example of a client-driven on-demand implemen-
tation of QSC over TLCB.
6.3 Complexity analysis
Implementing QSC over TLCB in this way in QSCOD, a
client that is already caught up to the servers’ states in-
curs O(n2) expected communication bits to propose and
reach agreement on a transaction. This is because the
client reads and writes only a constant number of O(n)-
size messages to the O(n) servers per consensus round,
and QSC requires a constant expected number of rounds
to reach agreement.
The client eliminates the need for broadcasts by effec-
tively serving in a “natural leader” role, analogous to an
elected leader in Paxos – but without Paxos’s practical
risk of multiple leaders interfering with each other to halt
progress entirely. When multiple QSCOD clients “race”
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to drive the servers’ implicit QSC/TLC state machines
concurrently in one consensus round, the round still pro-
gresses normally and completes with the same (constant)
success probability as with only one client.
Under such a time of contention, only one’s client’s
proposal can “win” and be committed in the round, of
course. Since in transactional applications clients whose
proposals did not win may need to retry, this contention
can increase communication costs and server load, even
though the system is making progress. Since each con-
sensus round is essentially a shared-access medium, one
simple way to mitigate the costs of contention is using
random exponential backoff, as in the classic CSMA/CD
algorithm for coaxial Ethernet [49]. Another approach is
for clients to submit transactions to a gossip network that
includes a set of intermediating back-end proxies, each
of which collect many clients’ transactions into blocks
to propose and commit in batches, as in Bitcoin [72].
This way, it does not matter to clients which proxy’s pro-
posal wins a given round provided some proxy includes
the client’s transaction in a block.
6.4 Implementation optimizations
The above complexity analysis assumes that a client is
already “caught up” to the servers’ recent state. Im-
plementations can enable a freshly-started or out-of-date
client can catch up efficiently, with effort and communi-
cation logarithmic rather than linear in the history size,
by writing summaries or “forward pointers” to the key-
value stores enabling future clients to skip forward over
exponentially-increasing distances, as in skip lists [79] or
skipchains [74].
7 Limitations and Future Work
The QSC and TLC protocols developed here have many
limitations, most notably tolerating only crash-stop node
failures [19,89]. It appears readily feasible to extendQSC
andTLC to tolerate Byzantine node failures along lines al-
ready proposed informally [41]. Further, it seems promis-
ing to generalize the principles of QSC and TLC to sup-
port quorum systems [20,45,63,65], whose threat models
assume that not just a simple threshold of nodes, but more
complex subsets, might fail or be compromised. Full for-
mal development and analysis of Byzantine versions of
QSC and TLC, however, remains for future work.
Most efficient asynchronous Byzantine consensus pro-
tocols rely on threshold secret sharing schemes [91,92,94]
to provide shared randomness [17, 21, 96] and/or efficient
threshold signing [3, 97]. Setting up these schemes asyn-
chronously without a trusted dealer, however, requires
distributed key generation or DKG [15, 52, 56, 103]. The
TLC framework appears applicable to efficient DKG as
well [41], but detailed development and analysis of this
application of TLC is again left for future work.
While this paper focuses on implementing consensus
in a fashion functionally-equivalent to [Multi-]Paxos or
Raft, it remains to be determined how best to implement
closely-related primitives such as atomic broadcast [19,
29, 33, 66] in the TLC framework. For example, QSC
as formulated here guarantees only that each round has
a reasonable chance of committing some node’s proposal
in that round – but does not guarantee that any particular
node’s proposals have a “fair” chance, or even even are
ever, included in the final total order. Indeed, a node that
is consistently much slower than the others will never see
its proposals chosen for commitment. An atomic broad-
cast protocol, in contrast, should guarantee that all mes-
sages submitted by any correct node are eventually in-
cluded in the final total order. The “fairness” or “eventual-
inclusion” guarantees required for atomic broadcast are
also closely-related to properties like chain quality re-
cently explored in the context of blockchains [10, 76, 77].
While the algorithms described above and their funda-
mental complexity-theoretic characteristics suggest that
QSC and TLC should yield simple and efficient proto-
cols in practice, these properties remain to be confirmed
empirically with fully-functional prototypes and rigorous
experimental evaluation. In particular, we would like to
see systematic user studies of the difficulty of implement-
ing QSC/TLC in comparison with traditional alternatives,
similar to the studies that have been done on Raft [47,75].
In addition, while we have decades of experience optimiz-
ing implementations of Paxos for maximum performance
and efficiency in deployment environments, it will take
time and experimentation to determine how these lessons
do or don’t translate, or must be adapted, to apply to prac-
tical implementations of QSC/TLC.
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8 Related Work
This section summarizes related work, focusing first on
TLC in relation to classic logical clocks, and then on
QSC in relation to other consensus protocols, first asyn-
chronous and then those specifically designed with sim-
plicity in mind.
Logical clocks and virtual time TLC is inspired
by classic notions of logical time, such as Lamport
clocks [57, 82], vector clocks [36, 37, 39, 62, 67] and ma-
trix clocks [34, 82, 87, 88, 102]. Prior work has used log-
ical clocks and virtual time for purposes such as discrete
event simulation and rollback [50], verifying cache co-
herence protocols [78], and temporal proofs for digital
ledgers [48]. We are not aware of prior work defining
a threshold logical clock abstraction or using it to build
asynchronous consensus, however.
Conceptually analogous to TLC, Awerbuch’s synchro-
nizers [7] are intended to simplify the design of dis-
tributed algorithms by presenting a synchronous abstrac-
tion atop an asynchronous network. Awerbuch’s synchro-
nizers assume a fully-reliable system, however, tolerat-
ing no failures in participating nodes. TLC’s purpose
might therefore be reasonably described as building fault-
tolerant synchronizers.
The basic threshold communication patterns TLC em-
ploys have appeared in numerous protocols in vari-
ous forms, such as classic reliable broadcast [13, 14,
84]. Witnessed TLC is inspired by threshold signature
schemes [12, 93], signed echo broadcast [3, 16, 84], and
witness cosigning protocols [74, 97]. We are not aware of
prior work to develop or use a form of logical clock based
on these threshold primitives, however, or to use them for
purposes such as asynchronous consensus.
Asynchronous consensus protocols The FLP theo-
rem [38] implies that consensus protocols must sacrifice
one of safety, liveness, asynchrony, or determinism. QSC
sacrifices determinism and implements a probabilistic ap-
proach to consensus. Randomness has been used in con-
sensus protocols in various ways: Some use private coins
that nodes flip independently but require time exponential
in group size [8,13,70], assume that the network embodies
randomness in the form of a fair scheduler [14], or rely on
shared coins [3, 9, 16–18, 21, 27, 28, 35, 42, 69, 71, 81, 96].
Shared coins require complex setup protocols, however, a
problem as hard as asynchronous consensus itself [15,52,
56, 103]. QSC in contrast requires only private random-
ness and private communication channels.
QSC’s consensus approach, where each node maintains
its own history but adopts those of others so as to converge
statistically, is partly inspired by randomized blockchain
consensus protocols [2, 43, 53, 72], which rely on syn-
chrony assumptions however. QSC in a sense provides
Bitcoin-like consensus using TLC for fully-asynchronous
pacing and replacing Bitcoin’s “longest chain” rule with a
“highest priority” rule.
Consensus protocols designed for simplicity Consen-
sus protocols, such as the classic (Multi-)Paxos [58], are
notoriously difficult to understand, implement, and rea-
son about. This holds expecially for those variants that
run atop asynchronous networks, can handle Byzantine
faults, or try to tackle both [17, 18, 22, 69, 70].
(Multi-)Paxos, despite being commonly taught and
used in real-world deployments, required a number of ad-
ditional attempts to clarify its design and further modi-
fications to adapt it for practical applications [25, 31, 54,
59, 60, 68, 99]. The intermingling of agreement and net-
work synchronization appears to be a source of algorith-
mic complexity that has not been addressed adequately in
past generations of consensus protocols, resulting in com-
plex leader-election and view-change (sub-)protocols and
restrictions to partial synchrony [47, 75]
In its aim for simplicity and understandability, QSC
is closely related to Raft [75], which however assumes
a partially-synchronous network and relies on a leader.
QSC appears to be the first practical yet conceptually sim-
ple asynchronous consensus protocol that depends on nei-
ther leaders nor common coins, making it more robust
to slow leaders or network denial-of-service attacks. The
presented approach is relatively clean and simple in part
due to the decomposition of the agreement problem (via
QSC) from that of network asynchrony (via TLC).
9 Conclusion
This paper has presentedQSC, the first asynchronous con-
sensus protocol arguably simpler than current partially-
16
synchronous workhorses like Paxos and Raft. QSC re-
quires neither leader election, view changes, nor common
coins, and cleanly decomposes the consensus problem it-
self from that of handling network asynchrony. With ap-
propriate implementation optimizations, QSC completes
in O(1) expected rounds per agreement, incurring O(n3)
communication bits in a broadcast-based group, orO(n2)
bits per client-driven transaction in an on-demand imple-
mentation approach.
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Appendix
A Correctness Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs for the theorems in the
main paper.
A.1 Que Sera Consensus (QSC)
This section contains correctness proofs for theQSC con-
sensus algorithm (Section 4).
Lemma 4.1. History preservation: If a consensus round
starting at time-step s has initial history hsi on node i,
then at any earlier consensus round starting at step s′ <
s, there exists some node j whose initial history hs′
j
in
that round is a strict prefix of hsi .
Proof. Let hsi be the initial history of the round start-
ing at step s on node i, let h′si and h
′′
si
be i’s proposed
and intermediate histories in that round, respectively, and
let (B′si , R
′
si
) and (B′′si , R
′′
si
) be the sets returned by the
round’s two Broadcast calls. By QSC’s requirement that
tb > 0 and the TSB’s broadcast threshold property (Sec-
tion 3), the sets B′si and B
′′
si
returned by the round’s
two Broadcast calls are each nonempty. By TSB’s re-
ceive threshold property, the returned sets R′si and R
′′
si
are nonempty as well. By message propagation through
these Broadcast calls, these sets consist solely of histo-
ries h′sj each proposed in the same round by some node
j, and each of which builds on j’s initial history hsj . By
induction over consensus rounds, therefore, at step s each
node i’s history hsi builds on some node j’s history hs′j
at each earlier step s′ < s. That is, hs′j is a strict prefix
of hsi .
Lemma 4.2. Agreement on delivery: IfQSC delivers his-
tory h(s+2)i on node i at the end of a consensus round
starting at time-step s, then the resulting history h(s+2)j
of every node j in the same round is identical to h(s+2)i .
Proof. Agreement can be violated only if some node j
arrives at a different resulting history h(s+2)j 6= h(s+2)i .
Because h(s+2)i ∈ B
′′
si
and B′′si ⊆ R
′′
sj
by TSB’s
broadcast spread property, i’s delivered history h(s+2)i is
also among the set of histories from which j chooses its
resulting (but not necessarily delivered) history h(s+2)j .
Because j chooses some best history from set R′′sj ,
h(s+2)j cannot have strictly lower priority than h(s+2)i ,
otherwise j would instead choose h(s+2)i . So we can
subsequently assume that the priority of h(s+2)j is greater
than or equal to that of h(s+2)i .
Every history occurring in j’s set R′′sj , however, is a
proposal derived (via the round’s second Broadcast call)
from a member of some set B′sk that the first Broadcast
call returned to some node k. Because B′sk ⊆ R
′
sj
by TSB’s broadcast spread property, both h(s+2)i and
h(s+2)j must therefore also appear in R
′
sj
. But then
h(s+2)i cannot be uniquely best inR
′
sj
, satisfying the sec-
ond condition on i delivering h(s+2)i , unless h(s+2)j =
h(s+2)i .
Lemma 4.3. If the network delivery schedule is indepen-
dent of proposal priorities and pt is the probability that
two nodes tie for highest priority, then each node delivers
a history in each round independently with probability at
least tb/n− pt.
Proof. We will show that in the absence of a tie for best
priority, node i’s probability of successfully finalizing a
round is tb/n. Since a round without a tie thus fails with
probability at most 1 − tb/n, by the Union Bound, the
overall probability of round failure is at most 1−tb/n+pt.
Let NB′si
, NR′si
, NB′′si
, NR′′si
each be the subsets of
nodes {1, . . . , n} whose messages i’s broadcast calls re-
turned in its respective sets B′si , R
′
si
, B′′si , R
′′
si
(Defini-
tion 3.1). By the above independence assumption, the net-
work adversary’s choices of these sets does not depend on
the content of messages or their priority values.
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If the set B′′si returned from i’s second broadcast con-
tains the round’s unique globally-best history hˆs, which
exists due to our exclusion of ties above, then i will nec-
essarily choose hˆs and deliver it. This is because hˆs must
also be in R′′si and in R
′
si
, and no other proposal exists in
either set with priority greater than or equal to that of hˆs.
This desirable event that hˆs ∈ B
′′
si
occurs if at least one
node j ∈ NB′′si
chose hˆs as its intermediate history h
′′
si
and broadcast it in j’s second call to Broadcast. Since the
probability of this event occuring for at least one node j
is no less than the probability of this event occuring for
any specific node j ∈ NB′′si
, we now conservatively focus
on analyzing this probability of any specific such node
j ∈ NB′′si
choosing hˆs.
If the set B′sj returned from j’s first broadcast contains
the round’s unique globally-best history hˆs, then j will
necessarily choose h′′sj = hˆs and broadcast it in j’s sec-
ond Broadcast call. This desirable event occurs in turn
if NB′sj
includes the node k that proposed the unique
globally-best history hˆs in this round. Since all nodes
choose their priorities from the same random distribution,
each node has an equal chance of proposing the globally-
best history hˆs. Since |NB′sj
| ≥ tb, node j therefore sees
hˆs in its set B
′
sj
with a probability of at least tb/n.
Node i therefore sees hˆs in its set B
′′
sj
and delivers a
history in this round with a probability of at least tb/n.
Theorem 4.1. QSC implements multi-consensus on n
nodes (Definition 4.1) atop a full-spread TSB primitive
TSB(tr, tb, n) where tr > 0 and tb > 0.
Proof. Liveness: QSC regularly advances time forever on
non-failing nodes by calling Broadcast twice each time
through an infinite loop, at each step delivering a history
with some independent nonzero probability (Lemma 4.3).
These delivered histories grow in length by one message
each time through the loop. Therefore, if h is the longest
history delivered by time-step s on a non-failing node i,
then with probability 1 there is eventually some future
time-step s′ > s at which node i delivers a longer his-
tory h′ (|h′| > |h|), thereby satisfying liveness.
Validity: If QSC invokes Deliver(h′||p) at step s′ on
node j, then by the TSB receive threshold property p is
a proposal 〈proposal i,m, r〉 that some node i appended
to its internal history hi and broadcast at step s = s
′ −
2, at the beginning of the same QSC round (main loop
iteration).
Consistency: IfQSC delivers h at step s on node i, then
delivers h′ at step s′ ≥ s on node j, then by induction
over s′ − s, using Lemma 4.2 as the base case, and using
Lemma 4.1 in the inductive step, h must be a prefix of
h′.
A.2 Threshold Logical Clocks (TLC)
This section contains correctness proofs for the threshold
logical clock algorithms in Section 5.
Theorem 5.1. TLCR (Algorithm 2) implements a
TSB(tr, 0, 0) communication primitive with receive
threshold 0 ≤ tr ≤ n, provided at most f ≤ n − tr
nodes fail.
Proof. Provided TLCR terminates, it satisfies the TSB’s
lock-step synchrony property (Definition 3.1), because
|~R| represents the current time-step at each invocation
counting from 2, and each TLCR call adds exactly one
element to ~R. Because at most f ≤ n− tr nodes can fail,
each non-failed node eventually receives a threshold tr of
messages from the tr non-failed nodes at each time-step,
ensuring that each TLCR call eventually terminates and
successfully advances logical time.
TLCR satisfies the TSB receive threshold property by
construction, i.e., by not returning until it accumulates and
returns a receive-set R of size at least tr – or until it ob-
tains such a set R all at once by catching up to another
node via a message from a future time-step. Because
messages are pairwise-ordered between nodes, the con-
dition s′ > |R| implies s′ = s + 1. Because the internal
receive-sets consist of pairs 〈j,m′〉 representing the send-
ing node j and message m′ that node j broadcast in the
same time-step, the returned setR contains messages sent
by at least tr nodes even if multiple nodes send the same
message, ensuring that the required node-set NR exists
(Definition 3.1).
TLCR trivially satisfies the broadcast threshold and
broadcast spread properties in Definition 3.1 by always
returning an empty broadcast set B, thereby making no
broadcast threshold promises to be fulfilled.
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Theorem 5.2. If 0 < tr ≤ n − f , 0 < ts ≤ tr, 0 <
tb ≤ n− fb where fb = tr(n− tr)/(tr − ts + 1), and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCB (Algorithm 3) implements
a TSB(tr, tb, ts) partial-spread broadcast abstraction.
Proof. In the second TLCR call, each node i collects at
least tr nodes’ receive-sets from the first TLCR call, each
of which contains at least tr nodes’ first-round messages.
We represent node i’s observations as a view matrix with
tr rows (one per-receive set) and n columns (one per
node), such that each cell j, k contains 1 if i’s receive-
set j indicates receipt of node k’s message from the first
TLCR round, and 0 otherwise.
Node i’s tr × n view matrix contains at least t
2
r one
bits, and hence at most tr(n− tr) zero bits. To prevent tb
nodes’ messages from reaching at least ts nodes each in
i’s view, the network must schedule the deliveries seen by
i so that at least n−tb+1 columns of i’s view matrix each
fail to contain at least ts one bits. Each such failing col-
umn must contain at least tr−ts+1 zero bits. Since there
are at most tr(n− tr) zero bits total, there can be at most
fb = tr(n− tr)/(tr− ts+1) failing columns. The matrix
must therefore have at least n − fb non-failing columns
representing reliable broadcasts to at least ts nodes each.
TLCB therefore satisfies the required broadcast threshold
tb since tb ≤ n− fb.
Theorem 5.3. If 0 < tr ≤ n−f , 0 < ts ≤ tr, tr+ts > n,
0 < tb ≤ n−fb where fb = tr(n−tr)/(tr−ts+1), and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCB (Algorithm 3) implements
a TSB(tr, tb, n) full-spread broadcast abstraction.
Proof. By Theorem 5.2, the returned broadcast setB con-
tains the messages sent by at least tb nodes in the first
TLCR step. Consider any such message m ∈ B and any
node i that completes this TLCB step without failing.
By construction, node i’s set B contains only messages
i knows have been received by at least ts nodes. There-
fore, there is some set Ns ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of nodes such
that |Ns| ≥ ts, and for each node j ∈ Ns, the intermedi-
ate receive set R′ on node j containsm.
Further, due to the receive threshold tr enforced by
TLCR, the message set R′′ returned on node i must con-
tain the intermediate message sets R′ that were returned
on at least tr nodes. That is, there is some set Nr ⊆
{1, . . . , n} of nodes such that |Nr| ≥ tr, and for each
node j ∈ Nr, the intermediate receive set R
′ returned on
node j is a subset of R′′ on node i.
Because tr+ts > n, the setsNs andNr must therefore
overlap by at least one node k. Node k therefore received
message m in its intermediate set R′, and thus in turn
must have passed m on to i via the second TLCR step.
Therefore, message m must be in the receive set finally
returned byTLCB on node i. Since this applies to all mes-
sagesm ∈ B and all nodes i, TLCB therefore implements
TSB(tr, tb, n) full-spread synchronous broadcast.
Theorem 5.4. If 0 < tb ≤ n− f , 0 < ts ≤ n− f , and at
most f nodes fail, then TLCW (Algorithm 4) implements
a TSB(tb, tb, ts) partial-spread broadcast abstraction.
Proof. TLCW satisfies theTSB’s lock step synchrony be-
cause (a) each call to TLCW only adds one element to
~R, which represents the current time-step, if it terminates,
and (b) because at most f ≤ n − tb nodes can fail, each
non-failed node eventually receives at least tb messages
from the non-failed nodes guaranteeing that each call to
TLCW eventually terminates and advances the logical
time. TLCW satisfies both the broadcast threshold and
broadcast spread properties by construction. Specifically,
TLCW does not return until it accumulates and returns a
broadcast-set B of size at least tb or until it obtains such
a set by catching up to another node via a message from a
future time step. The returned broadcast-setB consists of
at least tb fully witnessed messagesm
′ (satisfying broad-
cast threshold), where each node j announces that 〈j,m′〉
has been fully witnessed only after its message m′ was
acknowledged by ts nodes (satisfying broadcast spread),
given that at most f nodes can fail and tb, ts ≤ n − f .
Finally, since B ⊆ R, we get tr ≥ tb.
Theorem 5.5. If 0 < tr ≤ n − f , 0 < tb ≤ n − f ,
0 < ts ≤ n − f , tr + ts > n, and at most f nodes fail,
then TLCF (Algorithm 5) implements a TSB(tr, tb, n)
full-spread broadcast abstraction.
Proof. The proof is identical in essence to that of Theo-
rem 5.3.
B QSC model in Erlang
To illustrate QSC more concretely, this section lists a full
working model implementation of QSC atop TLCB and
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TLCR in Erlang [5]. The model implements nodes as
Erlang processes interacting via message passing, in less
than 73 code lineas as counted by cloc [32]. Of these,
only 37 code lines comprise the consensus algorithm it-
self, the rest representing test framework code.
Erlang is particularly well-suited to modelingQSC, be-
ing a distributed functional programming language with
a concise syntax. As a result, the actual working Erlang
code is not much longer in line count than the pseudocode
in Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 that it implements.
Erlang’s selective receive capability [101], in partic-
ular, simplifies implementation of TLCR. Selective re-
ceive allows TLCR to receive messages for the current
time-step and discard messages arriving late for past time-
steps, while saving messages arriving early for future
time-steps in the process’s mailbox for later processing.
B.1 qsc.erl: Erlang code listing
−module(qsc).
−export([qsc/1, tests /0 ] ).
% Node configuration is a tuple defined as a record .
−record(config, {node, tr , tb , ts , pids , choose, random, deliver }).
% A history is a record representing the most recent in a chain .
−record(hist, {step, node, msg, pri , pred}).
% qsc(C)−> (never returns)
% Implements Que Sera Co nsensus (QSC) atop TLCB and TLCR.
qsc(C) −> qsc(C, 1, #hist{step=0}). % start at step 1 with placeholder pred
qsc(# config{node=I, choose=Ch, random=Rv, deliver=D} = C, S0, H0)−>
H1 = #hist{step=S0, node=I, msg=Ch(C, S0), pri=Rv(), pred=H0},
{S1, R1, B1} = tlcb(C, S0, H1), % Try to broadcast (confirm) proposal
{H2, } = best(B1), % Choose some best eligible proposal
{S2, R2, B2} = tlcb(C, S1, H2), % Re−broadcast it to reconfirm proposal
{Hn, } = best(R2), % Choose best eligible for next round
{H3, Unique} = best(R1), % What is the best potential history ?
Final = lists :member(Hn, B2) and (Hn == H3) and Unique,
if Final −> D(C, S2, Hn), qsc(C, S2, Hn); % Deliver history Hn
true −> qsc(C, S2, Hn)% Just proceed to next consensus round
end.
% best(L) −> {B, U}
% Find and return the best ( highest−priority) history B in a nonempty list L,
% and a flag U indicating whether B is uniquely best ( highest priority ) in L.
best ( [H]) −> {H, true}; % trivial singleton case
best (L) −>
Compare = fun(#hist{pri=AR}, #hist{pri=BR})−> AR>= BR end,
[# hist{pri=BR} = B, #hist{pri=NR} | ] = lists : sort (Compare, L),
{B, (BR /= NR)}.
% tlcb (C, S, H)−> {S, R, B}
% Implements the TLCB algorithm for full−spread synchronous broadcast.
tlcb (#config{ts=Ts} = C, S0, H)−>
{S1, R1, } = tlcr (C, S0, H), % Step 1: broadcast history H
{S2, R2, } = tlcr (C, S1, R1), % Step 2: re−broadcast list we received
R = sets : to list ( sets :union( [ sets : from list (L) || L <− [R1 | R2]])),
B = [Hc || Hc <− R, count(R2, Hc)>= Ts],
{S2, R, B}. % New state, receive and broadcast sets
% count(LL, H)−> N
% Return N the number of lists in list−of−lists LL that include history H.
count(LL, H)−>
length( [L || L <− LL, lists:member(H, L)]).
% tlcr (C, S, M)−> {S, R, nil}
% Implements the TLCR algorithm for receive−threshold synchronous broadcast .
tlcr (#config{pids=Pids} = C, S, M)−>
[P ! {S, M} || P<− Pids], % broadcast next message
tlcr wait (C, S, [ ] ). % wait for receive threshold
tlcr wait (#config{tr=Tr} = C, S, R) when length(R)< Tr−>
receive {RS, RM} when RS == S−> tlcr wait(C, S, [RM | R]);
{RS, } when RS< S−> tlcr wait(C, S, R) % drop old msgs
end; % when RS > S message stays in the inbox to be received later
tlcr wait ( , S, R) −> {S+1, R, nil}.
% Run a test−case configured for a given number of potentially−failing nodes F,
% then signal Parent process when done.
test (F, Parent , Steps) −>
% Generate a standard valid configuration from number of failures F.
N = 3∗F, Tr = 2∗F, Tb = F, Ts = F+1,
io : fwrite (”Test N=˜p F=˜p˜n”, [N, F] ),
% Function to choose message for node I to propose at TLC time−step S.
Choose = fun(#config{node=I}, S)−> {msg, S, I} end,
% Choose a random value to attach to a proposal in time−step S.
% This low−entropy random distribution is intended only for testing ,
% so as to ensure a significant rate of ties for best priority .
% Production code should use high−entropy cryptographic randomness for
% maximum efficiency and strength against intelligent DoS attackers .
Random = fun()−> rand:uniform(N) end,
% The nodes will ” deliver” histories by sending them back to us.
Tester = self (), % Save our PID for nodes to send to
Deliver = fun(C, S, H)−> Tester ! {S, C#config.node, H} end,
% Receive a config record C and run QSC with that configuration .
RunQSC = fun()−> receive C−> qsc(C) end end,
% Launch a process representing each of the N nodes.
Pids = [spawn(RunQSC) || <− lists:seq(1, N)],
% Send each node its complete configuration record to get it started .
C = #config{ tr = Tr, tb = Tb, ts = Ts, pids = Pids ,
choose = Choose, random = Random, deliver = Deliver},
[ lists : nth( I , Pids) ! C#config{node=I} || I <− lists:seq(1, N)] ,
% Wait until the test has completed a certain number of time−steps.
test wait ( Parent , Pids , Steps , # hist{step=0}).
% Wait for a test to finish and consistency−check the results it commits
test wait (Parent , Pids , Steps , Hp)−>
receive {S, I , H} when S< Steps−>
io : fwrite (”˜p at ˜p committed ˜P˜n”, [ I , S, H, 8] ),
test wait ( Parent , Pids , Steps , test check (Hp, H));
{ , , }−>
[ exit (P, kill ) || P <− Pids], % stop all our nodes
Parent ! {} % signal test is done
end.
% test check (A, B) −> H
% Check two histories A and B for consistency , and return the longer one.
test check (# hist{step=AC,pred=AP} = A, #hist{step=BC} = B) when AC> BC−>
test check (AP, B), A; % compare shorter prefix of A with B
test check (# hist{step=AC} = A, #hist{step=BC,pred=BP} = B) when BC> AC−>
test check (A, BP), B; % compare A with shorter prefix of B
test check (A, B) when A == B−> A;
test check (A, B) −> io:fwrite(”UNSAFE ˜P /= ˜P”, [A, 8, B, 8]), A.
% Run QSC and TLC through a test suite .
tests () −>
Self = self (), % Save main process’s PID
Test = fun(F) −> % Function to run a test case
Run = fun() −> test(F, Self, 1000) end,
spawn(Run), % Spawn a tester process
receive {}−> {} end % Wait until tester child done
end,
[Test (F) || F <− [1,2,3,4,5]], % Test several configurations
io : fwrite (”Tests completed˜n”).
C QSCOD: Client-driven on-
demand QSC with TLCB
To provide a concrete illustration of the on-demand ap-
proach to implementing QSC and TLC outlined in Sec-
tion 6, Algorithm 6 shows pseudocode for client-driven
QSC built atop full-spread TLCB (Section 5.2.1).
In QSCOD, each client node wishing to submit pro-
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Algorithm 6: QSCOD: client-driven execution of QSC over TLCB
Configuration : node number i this thread drives, number of nodes n, thresholds tr ≤ n and ts ≤ n
Configuration : functions RandomValue, Writei, Readi, Deliver
Global state : client cache C of servers’ state; Cj,k holds value stored on server j under key k if known
Synchronization:WaitMessage()→ m waits for and returns the next message this client wishes to commit
Synchronization:WaitCache(k)→ R waits to collect and return set R of cached values Cj,k from ≥ tr nodes
q ← 1 // ficticious initial round
h← {} // empty history for ficticious initial round
m←WaitMessage () // wait for first message this client wishes to commit
forever // loop until any client thread determinesm was committed
q ← q + 1 // advance consensus round number
r ← RandomValue() // choose proposal priority using private randomness
h′ ← hc ← 〈Hash(h),m, r〉 // this client’s preferred proposal for this round
Writei(〈q, 1〉, 〈h, h
′〉) // try to record inputs to first TLCB
〈h, h′〉 ← Ci,〈q,1〉 ← Readi(〈q, 1〉) // finalize our view of inputs to first TLCB
R′1 ←WaitCache(〈q, 1〉) // tentative TLCB initial broadcast outcome
Writei(〈q, 2〉, R
′
1)) // try to record inputs to first TLCB re-broadcast
R′1 ← Ci,〈q,2〉 ← Readi(〈q, 2〉) // finalize our view of inputs to first TLCB re-broadcast
R′′1 ←WaitCache(〈q, 2〉) // tentative TLCB re-broadcast outcome
R1 ←
⋃
({R′1} ∪R
′′
1 ) // tentative receive-set return from first TLCB
B1 ← {m
′ | at least ts messages-sets in R
′′
1 containm
′} // tentative broadcast-set return from first TLCB
h′′ ← any best history in B1 // tentative history input to second TLCB
Writei(〈q, 3〉, 〈R1, B1, h
′′〉) // try to record inputs to second TLCB
〈R1, B1, h
′′〉 ← Ci,〈q,3〉 ← Readi(〈q, 3〉) // finalize our view of inputs to second TLCB
R′2 ←WaitCache(〈q, 3〉) // tentative TLCB initial broadcast outcome
Writei(〈q, 4〉, R
′
2) // try to record inputs to second TLCB re-broadcast
R′2 ← Ci,〈q,4〉 ← Readi(〈q, 4〉) // finalize our view of inputs to second TLCB re-broadcast
R′′2 ←WaitCache(〈q, 4〉) // tentative TLCB re-broadcast outcome
R2 ←
⋃
({R′2} ∪R
′′
2 ) // tentative receive-set return from second TLCB
B2 ← {m
′ | at least ts messages-sets in R
′′
2 containm
′} // tentative broadcast-set return from second TLCB
h← any best history in R2 // tentative history outcome for this round
if h = hc and h ∈ B2 and h is uniquely best in R1 then // history h has no competition
Deliver(h) // deliver newly-committed history containingm
m←WaitMessage () // wait for next message this client wishes to commit
end
end
posals and drive consensus locally runs n concurrent in-
stances of Algorithm 6, typically in separate threads, one
for each of the n servers providing key-value stores. Ini-
tially and after each successful commitment of a client’s
proposal, the client invokes WaitMessage to wait for the
next message to submit as a proposal. The client may
be quiescent for arbitrarily long in WaitMessage, during
which the client produces no interaction with the servers
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(but other clients can propose messages and drive consen-
sus in the meantime).
When WaitMessage returns the next message m to
be committed, each client thread actively drives the key-
value state of its respective server forward – in local co-
operation with other client threads driving other servers
– to complete as many consensus rounds as necessary to
commit the client’s proposed messagem.
Since each QSC round invokes TLCB twice, which in
turn invokes TLCR twice, each consensus round requires
fourTLCR time-steps. We could model eachTLCR round
as having tr+1 state transitions: one representing a given
node i’s initial broadcast, the rest for each of the tr mes-
sages subsequently “received” by i as its condition to ad-
vance logical time. It is possible and more efficient, how-
ever, to summarize the effects of all simulated message
“receives” in a time-step as part of the Write represent-
ing the node’s next broadcast. With this approach, Algo-
rithm 6 requires only four pairs ofWrite/Read requests to
each server per consensus round, one pair for each of the
four total TLCR invocations.
Coordination between the simulated consensus nodes
occurs via the client’s locally-shared cacheC of key-value
pairs that have been read from the n servers so far. After
attempting to write a value to a key, then reading back
that key to learn what value was actually written by the
“winning” client, each client thread invokes WaitCache
to wait until tr total threads also write and read corre-
sponding values for that key. The client thread represent-
ing node i takes this locally-determined set as a tentative,
possible receive-set of size tr for node i – but neither this
nor anything computed from it may be considered “defi-
nite” until the nextWrite/Read pair commencing the next
TLCR time-step.
Each client-side instance ofQSCOD evaluates theQSC
finality conditions, deciding whether the client’s message
has been successfully committed, based on tentative in-
formation not yet finalized on the corresponding server.
This may seem like a problem, but is not. Like any actual
broadcast-based server implementation of QSC, a client
thread will observe the finality conditions for history h
only when it is “inevitable” that all servers commit his-
tory h – regardless of whether or not they know that h is
committed. A client thread might observe that h is final,
deliver it to the application, then lose a race to commit that
result to the server at the start of the next time-step – but
this means only that the simulated server does not “know”
that h is committed, even though the client in question
(correctly) knows this fact.
C.1 Model QSCOD implementation in Go
To illustrate the operation of QSCOD more concretely,
this section finally presents a simple but fully-functional
model implementation of QSCOD in the Go language.
The model implements nodes as goroutines communi-
cating via shared memory instead of via real network
connections, and is only 200 code lines as counted
by cloc [32] including test infrastructure (less than
125 lines without). Despite its simplicity and lim-
itations, this model implements all the fundamental
elements of QSCOD, and can operate in truly dis-
tributed fashion by filling in core for remote access
to key/value stores representing the consensus nodes,
including the marshaling and unmarshaling of stored
values. The latest version of this model may be found at
https://github.com/dedis/tlc/tree/master/go/model/qscod.
C.2 cli.go: QSCOD client model
// Package qscod implements a simple model verison of the QSCOD algorithm
// for client−driven ”on−demand” consensus.
package qscod
import ”sync”
type Node int // Node represents a node number from 0 through n−1
type Step int64 // Step represents a TLC time−step counting from 0
// Hist represents the head of a node’s history , either tentative or finalized .
type Hist struct {
node Node // Node that proposed this history
step Step // TLC time−step number this history is for
pred ∗Hist // Predecessor in previous time−step
msg string // Application message in this proposal
pri int64 // Random priority value
}
// Set represents a set of proposed histories from the same time−step.
type Set map[Node]∗Hist
// best returns some maximum−priority history in a Set ,
// together with a flag indicating whether the returned history
// is uniquely the best , i . e ., the set contains no history tied for best .
func (S Set ) best () (∗Hist, bool) {
b, u := &Hist{pri: −1}, false
for , h := range S {
if h. pri >= b.pri {
b, u = h, !(h. pri == b. pri )
}
}
return b, u
}
// Store represents an interface to one of the n key/value stores
// representing the persistent state of each of the n consensus group members.
// A Store’s keys are integer TLC time−steps,
// and its values are Val structures .
type Store interface {
WriteRead(Step, Val) Val // Write if no value yet , then read
}
// Val represents the values that a consensus node’s key/value Store maps to.
type Val struct {
H, Hp ∗Hist
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R, B Set
}
// Client represents one logical client issuing transactions
// to the consensus group and driving the QSC/TLC state machine forward
// asynchronously across the n key/value stores .
type Client struct {
tr , ts int // TLCB thresholds
kv [] Store // Node state key/value stores
rv func() int64 // Function to generate random priority values
mut sync.Mutex // Mutex protecting the state of this client
cond ∗sync.Cond // Condition variable for cross−thread synchronization
msg string // Message we want to commit, ”” if none
msgh ∗Hist // History when message was committed
kvc map[Step]map[Node]Val // Cache of key/value store values
stop bool // Flag: true if the client should stop
}
// Start starts a Client with given configuration parameters .
func (c ∗Client) Start ( tr , ts int , kv [] Store , rv func () int64 ) {
c . tr , c. ts , c.kv, c. rv = tr , ts , kv, rv
// Initialize the client ’s synchronization and key/value cache state .
c .cond = sync.NewCond(&c.mut)
c .kvc = make(map[Step]map[Node]Val)
// Launch one client thread to drive each of the n consensus nodes.
for i := range kv {
go c . thread (Node(i))
}
}
// Commit requests the client to propose transactions containing
// application−defined message msg, repeatedly if necessary ,
// until some proposal containing msg successfully commits.
// Returns the history that successfully committed msg.
func (c ∗Client) Commit(msg string) ∗Hist {
c .mut.Lock() // keep state locked while we’re not waiting
c .msg = msg // give the client threads some work to do
c .cond.Broadcast () // wake up client threads if necessary
for c .msg == msg {
c .cond.Wait() // wait until msg has been committed
}
h := c .msgh // obtain history containing msg
c .mut.Unlock()
return h
}
// Stop shuts down a Client by signaling all its threads to terminate .
func (c ∗Client) Stop() {
c .mut.Lock()
c . stop = true // signal all threads that client is stopping
c .cond.Broadcast ()
c .mut.Unlock()
}
// thread represents the main loop of a Client ’s thread
// that represents and drives a particular consensus group node.
func (c ∗Client) thread (node Node) {
c .mut.Lock() // Keep state locked while we’re not waiting
s := Step(0)
h := (∗Hist)( nil ) // First proposal has no predecessor
for !c . stop {
for c.msg == ”” { // If nothing to do, wait for work
c .cond.Wait()
}
// Prepare a proposal containing the message msg
// that this Client would like to commit,
// and invoke TLCB to (try to) issue that proposal on this node.
v0 := Val{H: h, Hp: &Hist{node, s, h, c.msg, c . rv()}}
v0, R0, B0 := c . tlcb (node, s+0, v0)
h = v0.H // correct our state from v0 read
// Invoke TLCB again to re−broadcast the best eligible proposal
// we see emerging from the first TLCB instance,
// in attempt to reconfirm (double−confirm) that proposal
// so that all nodes will ∗know∗ that it’s been confirmed .
v2 := Val{R: R0, B: B0}
v2.Hp, = B0.best () // some best confirmed proposal from B0
v2, R2, B2 := c . tlcb (node, s+2, v2)
R0, B0 = v2.R, v2.B // correct our state from v2 read
h, = R2.best () // some best confirmed proposal from R2
b, u := R0.best () // is there a uniquely−best proposal in R0?
if B2[h.node] == h && b == h && u && h.msg == c.msg {
c .msg = ”” // msg has now been committed
c .msgh = h // record history that committed msg
c.cond.Broadcast () // signal Commit method
}
s += 4 // Two TLCB instances took two time−steps each
}
c .mut.Unlock()
}
// tlcb implements the TLCB algorithm for full−spread threshold broadcast ,
// each requiring two TLCR invocations and hence two TLC time−steps.
//
// The provided v0 represents a potential next state for this node,
// but other clients may of course race with this one to set the next state .
// The returned Val represents the next−state value successfully registered
// by whatever client won this race to initiate TLCB at step s .
//
// The returned R and B sets , in contrast , are tentative ,
// representing possible threshold receive−set and broadcast−set outcomes
// from this TLCB invocation, computed locally by this client .
// These locally−computed sets cannot be relied on to be definite for this node
// until the values computed from them are committed via Store .WriteRead.
//
func (c ∗Client) tlcb (node Node, s Step, v0 Val) (Val , Set , Set ) {
// First invoke TLCR to (try to) record the desired next−state value ,
// and record the definite winning value and a tentative receive−set.
v0, v0r := c . tlcr (node, s+0, v0)
// Prepare a value to broadcast in the second TLCR invocation,
// indicating which proposals we received from the first .
v1 := Val{R: make(Set)}
for i , v := range v0r {
v1.R[i ] = v.Hp
}
v1, v1r := c . tlcr (node, s+1, v1)
// Using the tentative client−side receive−set from the second TLCR,
// compute potential receive−set (R) and broadcast−set (B) sets
// to return from TLCB.
R, B, Bc := make(Set), make(Set), make([] int , len(c .kv))
for , v := range v1r {
for j , h := range v.R {
R[j] = h // R has all histories we’ve seen
Bc[j]++ // How many nodes have seen h?
if Bc[j ] >= c.ts { // B has only those reaching ts
B[j] = h
}
}
}
return v0, R, B
}
// tlcr implements the TLCR algorithm for receive−threshold broadcast ,
// each requiring a single TLC time−step.
//
func (c ∗Client) tlcr (node Node, s Step, v Val) (Val , map[Node]Val) {
// Create our key/value cache map for step s if not already created
if , ok := c .kvc[s ]; !ok {
c .kvc[s] = make(map[Node]Val)
}
// Try to write potential value v, then read that of the client who won
v = c.kv[node].WriteRead(s, v)
c .kvc[s ][node] = v // save value v in our local cache
// Wait until tr client threads insert values into kvc[s ],
// waking up all waiting threads once this condition is satisfied .
if len (c.kvc[s ]) == c . tr {
c .cond.Broadcast () // wake up waiting threads
}
for len (c .kvc[s ]) < c.tr {
c .cond.Wait() // wait to reach receive threshold
}
return v, c.kvc[s] // return some satisfying value set
}
C.3 cli test.go: QSCOD client testing
framework
package qscod
import ”fmt”
import ”math/rand”
import ”sync”
import ” testing ”
// Trivial intra−process key−value store implementation for testing
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type testStore struct {
kv map[Step]Val
mut sync.Mutex
}
// WriteRead implements the Store interface with a simple intra−process map.
func ( ts ∗ testStore ) WriteRead(s Step, v Val) Val {
ts .mut.Lock()
if , ok := ts .kv[s ]; !ok { // no client wrote a value yet for s?
ts .kv[s] = v // write−once
}
v = ts .kv[s] // Read the winning value in any case
ts .mut.Unlock()
return v
}
// Object to record the common total order and verify it for consistency
type testOrder struct {
hs []∗Hist // all history known to be committed so far
mut sync.Mutex // mutex protecting this reference order
}
// When a Client reports a history h has been committed,
// record that in the testOrder and check it for global consistency .
func ( to ∗testOrder) committed(t ∗ testing .T, h ∗Hist) {
if int (h. step /4) >= len(to.hs) { // one new proposal every 4 steps
if h.pred != nil {
to .committed(t , h.pred) // first check h’s predecessor
}
to .hs = append(to .hs, h)
}
if to .hs[h. step /4] != h {
t . Errorf (”%v UNSAFE %v != %v”, h.step/4, h.msg,
to .hs[h. step /4]. msg)
}
}
// testCli creates a test Client with particular configuration parameters .
func testCli ( t ∗ testing .T, self , nfail , ncom, maxpri int ,
kv [] Store , to ∗testOrder , wg ∗sync.WaitGroup) {
c := &Client{} // Create a new Client
rv := func() int64 { return rand. Int63n( int64(maxpri)) }
// Start the test Client with appropriate parameters assuming
// n=3f, tr =2f, tb=f , and ts=f+1, satisfying TLCB’s constraints .
c . Start (2∗nfail , nfail +1, kv, rv)
// Commit ncom messages, and consistency−check each commitment.
for i := 0; i < ncom; i++ {
h := c .Commit(fmt.Sprintf(” cli %v commit %v”, self, i ))
to .mut.Lock()
to .committed(t , h) // consistency−check history h
to .mut.Unlock()
}
// Stop the test Client
c .Stop()
wg.Done()
}
// Run a consensus test case with the specified parameters .
func testRun( t ∗ testing .T, nfail , nnode, ncli , ncommits, maxpri int ) {
desc := fmt. Sprintf (”F=%v,N=%v,Clients=%v,Commits=%v,Tickets=%v”,
nfail , nnode, ncli , ncommits, maxpri)
t .Run(desc, func( t ∗ testing .T) {
// Create a test key/value store representing each node
kv := make([]Store , nnode)
for i := range kv {
kv[i ] = &testStore{kv: make(map[Step]Val)}
}
// Create a reference total order for safety checking
to := &testOrder{}
// Simulate the appropriate number of concurrent clients
cli := make([]Client , ncli )
wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
for i := range cli {
wg.Add(1)
go testCli ( t , i , nfail , ncommits, maxpri, kv, to , wg)
}
wg.Wait()
})
}
func TestClient ( t ∗ testing .T) {
testRun( t , 1, 3, 1, 1000, 100) // Standard f=1 case
testRun( t , 1, 3, 10, 1000, 100)
testRun( t , 1, 3, 20, 1000, 100)
testRun( t , 2, 6, 10, 1000, 100) // Standard f=2 case
testRun( t , 3, 9, 10, 1000, 100) // Standard f=3 case
testRun( t , 4, 12, 10, 1000, 100) // Standard f=4 case
testRun( t , 5, 15, 10, 1000, 100) // Standard f=10 case
// Test with low−entropy tickets: hurts commit rate , but still safe !
testRun( t , 1, 3, 10, 1000, 2) // Extreme low−entropy: rarely commits
testRun( t , 1, 3, 10, 1000, 3) // A bit better bit still bad ...
}
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